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Turkey and Iraq
Interaction between Turkey and Iraq is rapidly increasing, with economic and strategic interests driving political cooperation, yet there are still longer-term challenges remain 
to be solved, particularly in relation to energy and water security. Iraq is one of Turkey’s 
most important trading partners and is becoming an essential source of energy. It attaches 
great deal of importance to Iraq’s stability and territorial integrity and sees those matters 
as crucial to its own security and stability. Turkey has become more active in Iraqi affairs, 
including burgeoning trade and investment relations, close communication with infl uential 
political actors and pro-active engagement with Iraqi Kurds. The elimination of the outlawed 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is a major security objective on the agenda of Turkish-Iraqi 
bilateral relations. Moreover, the future status of Kirkuk, an ethnically mixed city of Kurds, 
Arabs, and Turcomans, among them Muslims and Christians and home to some of the Iraq’s 
largest oil reserves, is another cause for concern for Turkey. Turkey’s principal anxiety is that 
the oil riches of Kirkuk will only encourage the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to 
seek greater autonomy, which may spill over into its own borders and spark unrest among 
Turkey’s own Kurdish population. Essentially, energy, economy and reconstruction form the 
crux of the Turkish involvement in Iraq.
Iraq, albeit reluctantly, perceives Turkey as an essential political power in its neighbourhood and a 
useful ally to rebuild Iraq’s economy and maintain a stable route for its exports. The Kurdish region 
has attracted enormous Turkish investment which has been central to its stability and development. 
However, this very region has put immense constraints on Turkey-Iraq relations since Turkey has serious 
concerns about Kurdish autonomy and PKK activities in northern Iraq.
A further area of political diffi culty is the fi nal status of the oil-rich Iraqi province of Kirkuk. Turkish 
offi cials have voiced their concerns over the fate of Kirkuk on a number of occasions, fearing that 
if Iraqi Kurds annex Kirkuk into their autonomous region, they will eventually want to carve out an 
independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq and thus stoke separatist desires in Turkey’s own Kurdish 
population. With the aim of preventing such an eventuality Turkey has developed close relations with 
Turcomen population that lives in Kirkuk in order to infl uence the developments and is utilising this 
small minority as a bargaining chip.
BACKGROUND
After the World War 2, Turkey usually cooperated with other western allies in the Middle East such as 
Iran, Israel, and Jordan in order to contain the infl uence of those countries regarded as Soviet clients, 
including Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Since 1954, Turkey has hosted a US Air Force base at Incirlik, which 
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has played a critical role during the Cold War, the 
Gulf War, and the recent Iraq War. During the 1990s 
Iraq was Turkey’s leading trading partner, with the 
Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan receiving oil 
by pipelines starting from Iraq’s northern oil fi elds 
and Iraqi markets were enjoying a wide range of 
goods from Turkey. Yet as the decade wore on United 
Nations sanctions had devastating effects both on the 
Turkish economy and Iraqi-Turkish trade relations. The 
United States-led invasion in 2003 caused instability 
on Turkey’s border with Iraq just as its fear of Kurdish 
separatism in northern Iraq was growing dramatically. 
The Iraq war made it imperative for Turkey to further 
cooperate with its immediate neighbours, including 
Iraq and Iran, since the war led to a seismic shift in 
the strategic balance of power and triggered deep 
structural changes in the Middle East. As such, Iraq’s 
fragmentation from a unitary state into a sectarian-
divided entity had grave implications on the systemic 
order of the region. No longer could Iraq act as buffer 
in a highly volatile part of the world, which involved 
thwarting Iranian regional ambitions and ensuring a 
Western-oriented Turkey. Contemporary Iraq is torn 
by competing powerplays between – and within – 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and, to a far less extent, Turkey. 
Saudi Arabia fears the winds of change blowing from 
Tunisia to Oman; Iran is playing a dominant role in 
the Arab world while its ally Syria is wracked by an 
escalating internal popular rebellion against single 
party rule. Turkish attempts to contain the chaos in 
Iraq, subdue Kurdish aspirations for self-determination 
and, at the same time, maintain balanced relations 
with Saudi Arabia and Iran is taxing Turkey’s foreign 
policy to the limits. Whilst Turkey may have gained 
international acclaim for pursuing a ‘zero problems 
with the neighbours policy’, a laudable goal of 
nurturing positive ties with the neighbours, it now 
looks increasingly unattainable at least in the short-
term as Iran favours Shiite activism and Saudi Arabia 
asserts Sunni interests in Iraq, Bahrain and across 
the Middle East. 
As a state directly neighbouring Iraq, Turkey had an 
interest in a stable Iraq and rejected the formation 
of an independent Kurdish state, primarily because 
it has a sizeable Kurdish minority and feared that 
Kurdish independence would lead to internal unrest 
and destabilization along its own border. Thus, Turkey 
was forced to reconsider emerging power and political 
relations in order to protect its interests. Gradually, 
Turkey assumed a greater role and became more 
directly involved in Iraq with the aim of protecting its 
strategic interests and impacting future developments. 
In this context, Turkey encouraged efforts towards 
Iraqi national reconciliation during which it brought 
together Sunni Arab Party representatives and the 
US Ambassador in Istanbul in December 2005. This 
was a turning point in Sunni Arab participation 
in the political process. Recently, Turkey played a 
central role in mediating with Sunni members of 
the Iraqi parliament for the purpose of supporting 
the Status of Forces Agreement with the United 
States in 2008. Turkey hosted training programs 
related to democratisation and good governance for 
Iraq’s political parties from all ethnic and sectarian 
backgrounds which have been attended by more 
than 500 Iraqi politicians, and the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Academy offers training programmes 
to Iraqi offi cials. All political parties participated in 
a conference on Iraq’s constitution in July 2006 
in Istanbul hosted in cooperation with the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, and Turkey initiated 
the Neighbouring Countries Process, to bring together 
Iraq with its neighbours for Ministerial consultations. 
This initiative evolved into the Enlarged Ministerial of 
Neighbouring Countries Meetings, now comprising 
the neighbours of Iraq, P-5 and G-8 Countries, as 
well as the UN, OIC, Arab League and the European 
Commission. 
Iraqi Shi’ite leaders have had ambivalent attitudes 
toward Turkey’s increasing involvement in Iraq for a 
number of reasons. First, the Turkish military has made 
frequent incursions into northern Iraq in pursuit of 
the PKK; second, Turkey is a pre-dominantly Sunni 
Muslim country; and third, they remember Turkey’s 
trade and business relations with Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. However, mutual economic interests and 
emerging geo-political realities of a post-American 
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withdrawal have pushed both sides to cooperate and 
compromise. As Iraq’s most stable neighbour, Turkey 
has been seen as a vital partner to build and stabilise 
the Iraqi economy and infrastructure – particularly in 
the energy and construction sectors; a window for 
exports and imports; and a source of much-needed 
international legitimacy for the Iraqi government. 
The improvement in relations has been refl ected 
in bilateral visits, in July 2008 when Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Iraq, during 
which Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agreed 
to boost economic relations, and in October 2010 
when al-Maliki visited Turkey seeking assistance in 
his bid to form a government following the Iraqi 
general elections.
ENERGY, ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS
Energy, economic and trade relations have generated 
increasing interdependence between Turkey and 
Iraq in recent years. Turkey hopes that gradually 
stabilising Iraq will generate further demand for 
goods, services and materials, which in return 
will create considerable business opportunities for 
Turkish companies. Excluding the oil sector, Turkey 
is the largest commercial investor in Iraq. Turkish 
companies generally provide manufactured goods, 
furniture, handicrafts, special-purpose products and 
associated consumables, and Turkey’s Trade Ministry 
estimates that the trade volume between Turkey 
and Iraq exceeded $6 billion in 2010, up from only 
$940 million in 2003, boosting Iraq’s position from 
Turkey’s tenth largest trade partner to the fi fth largest. 
Turkey is second only to China among the countries 
that have companies doing business in Iraq, with 
117 companies working on energy, agriculture and 
industrial projects. 
In an effort to sustain such economic ties, on 
19 October 2010 the Iraqi government created 
a committee to increase business and economic 
relations with Turkey with estimates for bilateral 
commercial exchange reaching $12bn by the end 
of 2011. This is a more than a three-fold increase 
on previous agreements. The commitment on both 
sides for enhancing commercial and trade relations 
was evident in January 2011 when Turkey declared 
that it would be pleased to see inclusion of Iraq in 
a planned free trade zone alongside Turkey, Syria, 
Jordan and Lebanon.
 
The booming construction and contracting market in 
Iraq, with a potential volume of $100 billion, accounts 
for the lion’s share of Turkey-Iraq trade volumes. A 
report by Turkey’s Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade 
published in 2010 noted that the rapid growth of 
construction and contracting sectors, which focus on 
infrastructure investments in water supply projects, 
waste water treatment plants, electricity power 
plants, hospitals, school and housing construction, 
highways, airlines, bridges and port construction. 
Turkish companies contracted 39 projects in 2007, 
with a volume of $545 million. In 2008, the number 
of projects rose up to 72, with a volume of $1.43 
billion. 
Energy is also a key feature in the bilateral relations. 
Iraq has had three rounds of oil and gas auctions since 
the US-led invasion in 2003. In the third round of 
auctions in 2010, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation was among the foreign companies with 
which Iraq signed deals to develop its natural gas 
fi elds. Iraqi gas is particularly important for Turkey, 
since it is expected to contribute supplies to the 
Nabucco gas pipeline, a project designed to carry 
Middle Eastern and Central Asian gas to European 
consumers via Turkey. Moreover, Iraqi natural gas 
could be connected to the Turkish national network 
through a pipeline to be constructed parallel to the 
Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Within this framework, a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed between 
Turkey and Iraq on 7 August 2007 in Ankara in order 
to supply Iraqi natural gas to Turkey and via Turkey 
to Europe. 
 
Although attacks by insurgents inside Iraq have 
repeatedly interrupted the fl ow of oil between 
Turkey and Iraq, the rate is currently around 450,000 
to 500,000 barrels per day. Ceyhan, on Turkey’s 
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Mediterranean coast of Turkey, is the terminus for a 
pipeline that transports crude oil from fi elds around 
Kirkuk in northern Iraq, which accounts for about a 
third of Iraq’s total crude exports. Iraq will be able to 
export crude oil for another 12 years through Ceyhan 
after both countries agreed to renew their accord in 
September 19, 2010.
In the other direction, Turkey provides 275 mw/h of 
electricity to Iraq and plans to increase this to 1200 
mw/h, one-quarter of Iraq’s electricity requirement. 
Furthermore, the Electricity Ministry of Iraq has 
awarded contracts worth more than $900 million 
to three Turkish companies for the installation of 20 
gas turbines in Baghdad, Kerbala and Nineveh, which 
will boost Iraq’s own power-generating capacity by 
2,500 megawatts. As part of the agreement, Calik 
Enerji, a Turkey-based company, would build a plant 
and install 10 turbines in Kerbala province in southern 
Iraq valued at $445.5 million. In addition, Turkish 
construction fi rm Enka Insaat has won a $267.5 
million deal to build a power plant and install six 
turbines in Nineveh province in northern Iraq, and 
Eastern Lights, another Turkey-based fi rm, will install 
four turbines in an existing plant in Baghdad under 
a contract worth $204.8 million.
Turkey’s policy of expanding trade and commercial 
relations with Iraq is part of a larger strategy to 
become an energy transit hub between east and west. 
Iraq’s natural resources might play an important role 
in the proposed Nabucco pipeline supplying Europe 
via Turkey. Moreover, construction and other related 
projects are providing excellent source of employment 
in Turkey’s southeast region which has long been 
economically underdeveloped. 
 
TURKEY AND THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENT (KRG)
Despite booming economic ties, bilateral engagement 
has been constrained by Turkey’s rejection of rising 
Kurdish autonomy and the presence of PKK bases in 
northern Iraq. In 2006 and 2007 Turkey threatened to 
limit economic and trade relations if the Iraqi central 
government did not take all necessary actions to root 
out PKK located at the border region. In 2007, Turkey 
took further steps and announced that Turkish offi cials 
were drafting plans to implement a food and energy 
embargo against Iraq when more than 40 Turks were 
killed in a month. In a highly controversial move, 
Turkey conducted an eight-day military incursion into 
northern Iraq targeting PKK strongholds in February 
2008. Although the US did express some reservations 
concerning the operation, it provided Turkey with 
actionable real-time intelligence. The Iraqi central 
government responded pragmatically, understanding 
Turkey’s need for action while condemning the 
military incursion simultaneously. This was one of 
the numerous incursions that Turkey has conducted 
into northern Iraq since 1990s. Although Turkey takes 
Iraqi relations very seriously, it is prepared to take 
unilateral security measures against the PKK in Iraq.
Until recently, Turkey did not recognise the KRG as an 
exclusively Kurdish entity and has usually preferred to 
work through the central government in Baghdad. 
This situation changed signifi cantly when the Turkish 
National Security Council made an offi cial decision 
to conduct direct discussions with all the political 
groups in Iraq. This has been possible due to a number 
of interrelated factors. Under the Status of Forces 
Agreement the planned withdrawal of US troops 
by the end of 2011 weakened the KRG’s position in 
relation to Turkey, as the US was its main supporter. At 
the same time, signifi cant economic interdependence 
and trade interests between the KRG and Turkey have 
emerged, puishing the KRG to increasingly cooperate 
with Turkey to contain the PKK as Turkey continues 
to seek internal stability and unity in Iraq between 
Kurds, Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites.
Thus, Turkey seems to be more fl exible in practice 
than it presents publicly in dealing with the Kurdish 
autonomous region. At the same time, since the US 
is aiming to withdraw its military forces by the end 
of 2011, the Kurds are also seeking to strengthen 
themselves against possible clashes with the Iraqi 
central government, utilising the extensive diplomatic 
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outreach that a strong relationship with Turkey can 
bring.
Turkey dominates the economy of the KRG region, 
where an estimated 80 percent of goods sold are 
imported from Turkey. Fifty-fi ve percent of the foreign 
companies registered in the KRG region are Turkish. 
According to a press statement issued by the regional 
government in April 2010, Turkey and KRG discussed 
opening the airway between Sulaimaniya, Erbil and 
Turkey to improve travel for citizens, companies 
and businesspeople which may further strengthen 
economic and business ties. 
Private Turkish companies have already made huge 
investments in the KRG region, especially in the oil 
fi elds of Tak Tak, Khor Mor and Chemchemal. The 
efforts of companies like Genel Energy of Turkey, 
Dana gas of Norway, and Nabucco’s chief operating 
company OMV make it highly pertinent to develop 
a direct connection to Turkey from the KRG region.
The close trade and commercial ties with Turkey are 
critical to realising the KRG’s economic potential 
and to ensuring the long-term stability of the KRG 
economy. Meanwhile, Turkey understands that it 
needs the full cooperation of local Kurdish authorities 
in northern Iraq if it wants to eliminate PKK.
FUTURE ENERGY AND WATER SECURITY 
CHALLENGES 
Turkey has fundamental fl aws regarding energy 
effi ciency, savings, external dependency and intensity. 
Equally worrisome is the fact that Turkey is far behind 
Western countries in terms of benefi ting from 
renewable energy sources to counter balance its 
dependence on carbon fuels. Rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation is driving rising energy consumption 
and external dependency. 
What international analysts and commentators often 
fail to observe and critically neglect is that Turkey 
is neither an oil nor a natural gas producer. Turkey 
plans to meet its rising energy need in several ways 
but hydro-power seems more appealing to Turkish 
authorities because it is clean and cheap. Again, 
contrary to the general perception, Turkey is neither 
a country rich in fresh water resources nor the richest 
country in the region. Turkey’s exploitation of the 
waters of Euphrates and Tigris rivers has long been 
controversial. Since 1984 Turkey has been building a 
series of dams and hydropower plants in southeast 
Turkey, as part of an ambitious scheme known South-
East Anatolia Project or GAP. Iraq regularly complains 
that the scheme is depriving the Iraqi population of 
much-needed water. 
In Iraq, consecutive years of drought, war and 
lack of adequate governance has hindered overall 
development of the water sector. It faces the threat 
of desertifi cation at an average rate of 0.5 percent a 
year. The fl ow of Euphrates in Iraq declined from the 
long-term average of 27 billion cubic metres (BCM) to 
9 BCM in 2009. Desertifi cation is expected to affect 
Turkey too. For example, in the Konya basin, about 
80 percent of the depletion has occurred over the last 
decade, and the basin faces complete desertifi cation 
by 2030. There is serious disagreement about the 
actual amount of fl ow of the rivers across national 
boundaries, with Iraq asking for 65 percent of the 
water potential of the Euphrates and 92 percent of 
the Tigris while Turkey plans to use about 52 percent 
of Euphrates and 14.1 percent of the Tigris.
CONCLUSION
Economic and strategic interests are facilitating 
political cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, but 
energy and water security are the main obstacles 
to enduring good relations . Few commentators 
believe that water alone can become the cause 
of war between Turkey and Iraq; nevertheless its 
destabilising effect is apparent. Turkey’s mounting 
energy demand, coupled with the devastating effect 
of climate change and drought, may put burgeoning 
Turkish-Iraqi relations under intense pressure if robust 
and adequate mechanisms guaranteeing clean and 
sustainable water resources are not in place. ■
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